Economic Fury Disrupts Foreign Networks Supporting Iran’s Military and Weapons Programs | U.S. Department of the Treasury
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Economic Fury Disrupts Foreign Networks Supporting Iran’s Military and Weapons Programs
June 10, 2026
WASHINGTON— Today, as part of Economic Fury, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned nine individuals and entities that have supported weapons procurement on behalf of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL).
“Through Economic Fury, the Treasury Department is disrupting the foreign procurement networks that support the Iranian military’s efforts to acquire weapons,” said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent . “Treasury has frozen the Iranian regime’s assets, severely disrupted its economy, and dismantled the Iranian war machine. Treasury will not tolerate any support of the Iranian military.”
Among those designated are China- and Hong Kong-based individuals and companies that facilitated the procurement of weapons for the IRGC and MODAFL, as well as a Hong Kong‑based company operating within Iran’s clandestine banking network that attempted weapons procurement-related transactions. OFAC continues to aggressively target the overseas procurement and financial networks that sustain Iran’s weapons production and proliferation capabilities, which threaten Americans and U.S. partners and allies around the world. Today’s action builds on the May 8, 2026 designations targeting procurement networks that sourced weapons for the IRGC and Iran’s Center for Innovation and Technology Cooperation (CITC), which coordinates Iranian technology acquisition efforts and has sought to purchase weapons, including man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS), from China.
OFAC is taking this action pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13382, which targets weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferators and their supporters, and Executive Order (E.O.) 13902, which targets persons operating in Iran’s financial sector. The U.S. Department of State designated the IRGC and MODAFL pursuant to E.O. 13382 in October 2007 in connection with Iran’s ballistic missile program. Today’s action is in furtherance of National Security Presidential Memorandum 2 , which, among other directives, instructs the U.S. government to deny Iran’s IRGC access to assets and resources that sustain its destabilizing activities.
Concurrent with OFAC’s designations, the Department of State is imposing sanctions on two entities and two individuals based in Iran and Belarus pursuant to E.O. 13949, in connection with Iran’s conventional arms-related activities.
ECONOMIC FURY DELIVERS MAXIMUM PRESSURE ON IRAN
The Treasury Department is maintaining maximum pressure on Iran and targeting the regime’s ability to generate, move, and repatriate funds. Treasury is aggressively advancing Economic Fury and has disrupted tens of billions of dollars’ worth of revenue from being otherwise accessible to the Iranian regime and its proxies. This includes actions that have led to the freezing of large amounts of regime-linked cryptocurrency. In addition, Treasury has cracked down on Tehran’s global shadow banking networks; designated networks supplying weapons and other military components to Iran; sanctioned a corrupt Iraqi official who has facilitated the sale of oil along with Iran-backed militias operating in Iraq; taken numerous actions against Iran’s terrorist proxies; and targeted shadow fleet vessels, companies, and other entities that sustain Iran’s illicit oil industry.
Through the blockade, the Trump Administration is directly targeting the regime’s primary revenue stream. Any person or vessel facilitating the illicit trade of oil or other commodities, through covert trade or financial channels, risks exposure to U.S. sanctions.
Treasury will continue to vigorously target both traditional sanctions evasion schemes and the exploitation of digital assets while continuing to freeze funds stolen from the Iranian people. Treasury is also prepared to take action against any foreign company or individual supporting illicit Iranian commerce, including through support for Mahan Air and Iran Air , and, as necessary, may impose secondary sanctions on foreign financial institutions that facilitate activities for sanctioned Iran-linked actors or sectors—including those connected to the People’s Republic of China’s independent “teapot” oil refineries.
Additionally, Treasury recently warned of the sanctions risk associated with complying with Iranian demands for passage through the Strait of Hormuz including soliciting guarantees of safe passage or maritime services, and making “toll” payments , including payments made via fiat currency, digital assets, offsets, informal swaps, or other in-kind services or payments, such as nominally charitable donations, and providing sensitive vessel information.
IRGC PROCUREMENT NETWORK AND CLANDESTINE BANKING IN CHINA AND HONG KONG
Chinese national Liu Boyu is the sole director of Mustad Limited (Mustad), a U.S.-designated, Hong Kong-registered company that, as an intermediary, has facilitated, or attempted to facilitate, financial transactions in furtherance of the IRGC’s procurement of millions of dollars’ worth of weapons. Liu Boyu also serves as Mustad’s president. Liu Boyu and Chinese nationals Wang Hongyi and Xu Lichun , also employees of Mustad, have worked to procure weapons on behalf of the IRGC. Shanghai-based Mustad Shanghai International Trade Co Ltd (Mustad Shanghai) is wholly owned by Mustad. OFAC designated Mustad pursuant to E.O. 13382 on May 8, 2026 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, the IRGC.
Liu Boyu and Xu Lichun are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, the IRGC. Wang Hongyi and Mustad Shanghai are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for being owned or controlled by, or acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Mustad.
Hong Kong-based Domus Trading HK Limited (Domus Trading) works within Iran’s clandestine banking network to facilitate payments on behalf of Iranian blocked persons and has attempted to facilitate payments for Iran’s weapons procurement efforts.
Domus Trading is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for operating in the financial sector of the Iranian economy.
MODAFL PROCUREMENTS
China-based Iranian national Manuchehr Golchin (Golchin) serves as a facilitator for MODAFL’s defense acquisitions from China. Chinese national Meng Shaopei (Meng), an accomplice of Golchin, is the managing director and 100-percent owner of Hong Kong-based Solos International Limited (Solos), which has worked to facilitate weapons procurement for MODAFL. Golchin is the chairman of Hong Kong-based Shangshun Hong Kong Ltd (Shangshun)and oversees the company’s international partnerships. Meng is also part of Shangshun’s management team.
Golchin, Meng, and Solos are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, MODAFL. Shangshun is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for being owned or controlled by, or acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Golchin.
SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS
As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the designated or blocked persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. Unless authorized by OFAC, or exempt, OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of blocked persons.
Violations of U.S. sanctions may result in the imposition of civil or criminal penalties on U.S. and foreign persons. OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict liability basis. OFAC’s Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provide more information regarding OFAC’s enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions. In addition, financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities involving designated or otherwise blocked persons. The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any designated or blocked person, or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person. Non-U.S. persons are also prohibited from causing or conspiring to cause U.S. persons to wittingly or unwittingly violate U.S. sanctions, as well as engaging in conduct that evades U.S. sanctions. Individuals located in the U.S. or abroad who provide information about sanctions violations to FinCEN’s whistleblower incentive program may be eligible for awards if the information they provide leads to a successful enforcement action that results in monetary penalties exceeding $1,000,000.
Furthermore, engaging in certain transactions involving the persons designated today may risk the imposition of secondary sanctions on participating foreign financial institutions. OFAC can prohibit or impose strict conditions on opening or maintaining, in the United States, a correspondent account or a payable-through account of a foreign financial institution that knowingly conducts or facilitates any significant transaction on behalf of a person who is designated pursuant to the relevant authority.
The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to designate and add persons to the SDN List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, or to submit a request, please refer to OFAC’s guidance on Filing a Petition for Removal from an OFAC List .
Click here for more information on the persons designated today .
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